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Advance Fin. Co. 
v. Trustees of Clients , 
Sec. Trust Fund of 
Bar of Md.: 
NON-CLIENT IS 
ELIGIBLE AS A 
CLAIMANT 
AGAINST THE 
TRUST FUND IF 
ANATTORNEY 
EMBEZZLES A 
CLIENT'S FUNDS 
WHICH WERE 
INTENDED FOR 
THE NON-CLIENT. 
In Advance Finance Co. 
v. Trustees of Clients ' Sec. Trust 
Fund of Bar of Md., 337 Md. 
195, 652 A.2d 660 (1995), the 
court of appeals held that an 
attorney acts as a fiduciary for a 
non-client when the attorney 
disburses a client's funds from 
the attorney's trust account to 
the non-client, at the instruc-
tion of the client. By elevating 
an attorney to a fiduciary status 
in such a transaction, the court 
expanded the realm of claims 
the Client's Security Trust Fund 
must entertain to include not 
only a client's loss due to an 
attorney's defalcation, but also 
any non-client's loss to whom 
the attorney was instructed by 
the client to distribute the defal-
cated funds. 
Advance Finance Com-
pany ("Advance"), a consumer 
loan company, made loans to 
personal injury claim plaintiffs 
secured by assignments of pro-
ceeds of the injury claims. Two 
Maryland attorneys ("Attor-
neys"), now disbarred, arranged 
such loans for their clients in 
order to pursue personal injury 
claims. In order to secure a 
loan, each client was required 
to execute an "Authorization 
and Assignment" supplied by 
Advance, which assigned and 
directed the Attorneys to pay 
any such recovery in each cli-
ent's case to Advance. Over an 
eleven month period, Advance 
made seventy-seven loans to 
the Attorneys' clients, and the 
Attorneys remitted the money 
due to Advance from settlement 
of the cases. Thereafter, the 
Attorneys ceased remitting to 
Advance, and Advance filed a 
claim against each Attorney 
with the Client's Security Trust 
Fund of the Bar of Maryland 
("Fund"). The Fund denied the 
claims and Advance filed ex-
ceptions with the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland. 
The court began its anal-
ysis by setting forth the general 
purpose of the Fund, which is 
"to maintain the integrity and 
protect the good name of the 
legal profession by reimburs-
ing ... losses caused by defal-
cations of members of the Bar." 
Advance, 337 Md. at 200, 652 
A.2d at 662 (citing Md. Rule 
1228(b)(3». Tumingtothespe-
cific criteria for eligibility, the 
court noted that "the trustees 
may use the Fund to reimburse 
a person for a loss that was 
caused by a defalcation of a 
lawyer if " ... the lawyer caused 
the loss while acting for the 
person as an attorney of law or 
a fiduciary." Id. (citing Md. 
Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 
1O-312(b)(1) (1989». 
In rejecting Advance's 
first argument, that the Attor-
neys were fiduciaries because 
they were trustees of trusts of 
which Advance was the benefi-
ciary' the court relied on the 
Restatement (Second) of Agen-
cy: "[a]1though an agent re-
ceives money from his princi-
pal for payment to another and, 
by implication or otherwise, 
promises the principal to pay 
the other, he does not ordinarily 
become a trustee of the money, 
even though directed to pay over 
the specific money." Advance, 
at 204,652 A.2d at 664 (quot-
---- --- ---- ---~-------------
ing Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 342(3) cmt. b (1958)). 
The court concluded that the 
loan transactions, as structured 
by Advance, did not "transcend 
the ordinary, so as to create a 
trust." Id. at 204, 652 A.2d at 
664. 
The court then turned 
its attention to Advance's sec-
ond exception, that the Attor-
neys were fiduciaries for Ad-
vance as a result of their ethical 
obligations under rule 1.15(b). 
The rule provides "[u]pon re-
ceiving funds or other property 
in which a client or a third per-
son has an interest, a lawyer 
shall promptly notify the client 
or third person ... and promptly 
deliver ... any funds or other 
property that the client or third 
person is entitled to receive." 
Id. at 204, 652 A.2d at 664 
(quoting Md. Lawyers' R. of 
Prof. Conduct 1.15(b)). 
The court found support 
for this proposition in three ar-
eas. First, the commentto Con-
duct Rule 1.15 recognizes that a 
lawyer should hold the proper-
ty of others with the care of a 
fiduciary, and may have a duty 
to protect third party claims 
from wrongful interference of 
the client. Id. at 205-06, 652 
A.2d at 665 (citing Md. Law-
yers' R. of Prof. Conduct 1.15 
cmt.). In addition, the com-
ment provides that "a lawyer 
who serves as an escrow agent 
is governed by the applicable 
law relating to fiduciaries even 
though the lawyer does not ren-
der legal services in the transac-
tion." Id. at 206, 652 A.2d at 
665 (quoting Md. Lawyers' R. 
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of Prof. Conduct 1.15 cmt.). 
Second, the court looked to The 
Law of Lawyering, whose au-
thors added "Rule 1.15(b) ... 
extends its protection to include 
third party interests as well as 
those of clients." Id. (quoting 
G. Hazard, Jr. & W. Hodes, The 
Law of Lawyering § 1.15:301, 
at 459-60 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 
1994)). Third, the court cited 
previous disbarment decisions 
where they had ruled, in the 
context 0 f tort claim settlement 
funds, that an attorney has a 
duty to promptly deliver a cli-
ent's funds to a non-client pur-
suant to the client's instructions. 
Id. at 207, 652 A.2d 665-66 
(citing Attorney Grievance 
Comm 'n v. Singleton, 311 Md. 
1,16, 532A.2d 157,165 (1987); 
Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. 
Morehead, 306 Md. 808, 818, 
511 A.2d 520,525 (1986)). 
Based on this authority, 
the court concluded that an at-
torney acts as a fiduciary for a 
non-client within the meaning 
of the Business Occupations and 
Professions Code, section 10-
312(b)(I)andofMarylandRule 
1228(b)(3), when the attorney 
disburses client funds from the 
attorney's trust account to anon-
client, at the instructions ofthe 
client and pursuant to the obli-
gations recognized in Conduct 
Rule 1.15. Id. at208, 652 A.2d 
at 666. The court was careful to 
point out that it realized that the 
Conduct Rules were not meant 
to be a basis of civil liability, 
but noted that this was a claim 
by Advance for reimbursement 
under the Fund, not an attempt 
to impose civil liability on the 
Attorneys. Advance, at 207 -08, 
652 A.2d at 666 (citing Md. 
Lawyers' R. of Prof. Conduct 
Scope Note, 2 Md. Rules 475 
(Md. Code 1994)). Further-
more, the court reasoned that to 
recognize as a matter of legal 
ethics that an attorney is the 
fiduciary of a non-client vic-
tim, but then to tell that same 
non-client victim that it is ques-
tionable whether that obliga-
tion is civilly enforceable as a 
basis for monetary recovery 
against the attorney, would pro-
duce the exact result the Fund 
was created to avoid. Id. at 208, 
652 A.2d at 666. The court 
explained by citing the initial 
report of the M.S.B.A. Com-
mittee that recommended a cli-
ents' security fund, which had 
specifically proposed reimburse-
ment whether the loss was caused 
by a lawyer acting as an attor-
ney or fiduciary because "the 
public doesn't know the differ-
ence between a lawyer as a law-
yer who might get a settlement 
and put the money in his pock-
et, and a lawyer who was an 
executor and trustee and there-
by gets funds and withholds 
them in that fiduciary capaci-
ty." Id. at 209,652 A.2d at 666 
(citing 69 Transactions 
M.S.B.A. at 225-26 (1964)). In 
addition, the court emphasized 
that in the past, the Fund had 
paid non-client victims of at-
torney defalcations in the real 
estate settlement context and, 
on a claim by a client, issued a 
joint check to the client and 
physician in the personal injury 
context. Id. at 210, 652 A.2d at 
667. The court saw little differ-
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ence in these Fund approved 
payments and the claim of Ad-
vance. Id. 
The court concluded by 
giving specific judicial recog-
nition to Advance's argument, 
holding that it is consistent with 
the purposes ofthe Fund to rec-
ognize that the fiduciary ethical 
obligation embodied in Con-
duct Rule 1.15 is a fiduciary 
obligation under the Fund's stat-
utes and rules. Id. at 210-11, 
652 A.2d at 667. The court 
vacated the Fund's decision and 
Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Cochran: 
EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE MAY 
BE USED BY 
INSURED TO 
ESTABLISH 
INSURER'S DUTY 
TO DEFEND 
UNDER LIABILITY 
POLICY. 
remanded for a determination 
on reimbursement. Id. at 211, 
652 A.2d at 667-68. 
In its simplest form, the 
court's decision in Advance 
Finance Co. v. Trustees ofCli-
ents 'Sec. Trust Fund of Bar of 
Md expands a non-client's eli-
gibility as a claimant against 
the Fund. However, Advance 
derives its true impact from the 
court's recognition that a non-
client's loss from an attorney's 
defalcation, at least where a cli-
ent has instructed the attorney 
In Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md 
98, 651 A.2d 859 (1995), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that an insured may use 
extrinsic evidence to establish a 
potentiality of coverage under 
an insurance policy when the 
plaintiff s complaint is silent as 
to possible defenses entitled to 
coverage. The court rejected an 
earlier decision by the court of 
special appeals which mandat-
ed that determining the possi-
bility of coverage of an insured 
tort defendant be made solely 
by reference to the language of 
the insurance policy and the 
complaint made against him. 
In so holding, the court reme-
died any inequities in the inter-
pretation of coverage under lia-
bility insurance policies and 
addressed public policy con-
cerns regarding an insured's 
, 
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to disburse the client's funds to 
the non-client, is no less dam-
aging to the legal profession's 
credibility that the same loss to 
the client. This is precisely the 
situation the Fund was estab-
lished to address, and although 
the court's decision may in-
crease the potential for recov-
ery, it should be welcomed by 
attorneys at a time when the 
term "legal ethics" is all too 
often, whetherjustifiablyornot, 
considered a misnomer. 
-Mark L. Miller 
reasonable expectations. 
Victoria and Robert Beyer 
sued Robert Cochran for as-
sault, battery, and loss of con-
sortium for injuries Victoria re-
ceivedduringaMarch 19,1990 
altercation between Cochran 
and his brother at Cochran's 
office. At the time of the al-
leged incident, Cochran was 
covered under two office liabil-
ity policies issued by Aetna. 
Although the policies provided 
no coverage for intentional or 
expected bodily injury or prop-
erty damage caused by the acts 
of the insured, both provided 
coverage for intentional acts of 
self-defense. Despite Cochran's 
contention thatBeyer' s injuries 
occurred while he was defend-
ing himself against his broth-
er's assault, Aetna refused to 
provide him with counsel to 
defend against the Beyer ac-
